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STATE OF UTAH 
DON GERALD WILLIAMS; JAMES 
ALLEN SCOTT; JEANETTE WAL-
TON, Administratrix of the Estate 
of ROBERT WALTON, Deceased; 
BOYD SIMMONS; ANGELO MELO; 
WAULSTINE McNEELEY and 
WILLIAM J. ROEDEL, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
FINANCE as Administrator of the 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11753 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petitioners, with the hopeful expectation that the 
court will granrt their petition and afford them the privilege 
of appearing amicus curiae in this matter, have prepared 
this brief in support of tire Petitions for Rehearing that have 
been filed by the plaJintiffs herein. This brief will develop 
the reasons for rehearing or clarification set forth in said 
petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The pl1aintiffs 10btained a summary judgment, based 
upon stipulated facts, from 1the triai court which rendered 
a memorandum deoision that held that the case of Worthen 
V. Shurtleff & Andrews, 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P. 2d 223 
(1967), was controlling rather than the case of McConnell 
V. Comm'r of Fin., 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P. 2d 394 ( 1962). 
This decision was reverned by this Court, ho1ding that the 
Worthen case would not be applied retroactively and that 
the McConnell decision was controlling. ,Plwintiff.s-respon-
dents have filed Petitions for Rehearing ':Seeking a reversal 
of this Comt's opinion and affirmance of the district court 
judgment. Because the present opinion of this Court is the 
first holding in this State wi1th respect to the important 
rule of retroactivity of judicial decisions, and its effedt, 
therefore, may be profound, petitioners join in seeking a 
and reversal or a clarification of the holding of 
the Court. 
STATEMENT OF POSITION 
In 1912, the Utah Legislature enacted Section 35-1-62, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows: 
When any injury or death for which com-
pensation is payable under this title shall haYe 
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of an-
other person not in the same employment, the in-
jured employe€, or in case of death his dependents, 
may claim compensation and the injured employee 
or his heirs or personal rep1·esentatives may also 
have an action for damages against such third per-
son. If compensation is claimed and the employer 
or insurance carrier becomes obligaited to pay com-
pensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall 
become trustees of the cause of action against the 
third party and may bring and maintain the action 
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either in iits own name or in the name of the injured 
employee, or his 'heirs or the personal representa-
tive of the deceased, provided the employer or car-
11ier may not settle and release the cause of action 
w:ithout the consent of the commission. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third 
person it shall be disbursed as follows : 
( 1) The reasonable expense of the action, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, shall be pa;id and charged 
proportionately against the partie.s as their interests 
may appear. 
(2) The person liable for compensation pay-
ments shall be reimbursed in full for all payments 
made. 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured 
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be ·applied 
to reduce or satisfy in full any oblii.gation thereafter 
accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
In October, 1962, the Utah Supreme Court in Mc-
Connell v. Comm'r of Fin., supra, first discussed the effect 
of Section 35-1-62. The essential facts in McConnell were 
as follows: 
( 1) Plaintiff, while in the course and scope of his 
employment was injured. 
(2) The State Insurance Fund, as workmen's com-
pensation carrier, paid compensation to plaintiff. 
( 3) Plaintiff recovered damages from the third-
party tortfeasor. 
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( 4) Plaintiff reimbursed the State Insurance Fund 
for workmen's compensation paid. 
( 5) Plwintiff commenced an action against the State 
Insurance Fund (Commission of Finance) to recover back 
attorney's fees from the State Insurance Fund. 
(6) The trial court awarded plaintiff summary 
judgment, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding 
as follows: 
With relation to the disbursement of the pro-
ceeds in a recovery against a third party, the first 
subsection of the statute gives a first prio:riity to 
the payment of costs, including attorney's fees, of 
the action. These expenses are to be apportioned 
among the parties. 
The second subsection gives a second priority 
to the reimbursement in full to the insurance car-
rier made by it in way of compensation to the in-
jured employee. 
* * * in the instant case, the State lm>cE'-
ance Fund was not a party to the acti'On and did not 
incur any legal expenses. 
* * * If the plaintiff were right in his con-
tention that an insurance carrier is liable for its 
proportionate share of the costs and fees, then an 
insurance carrier would never be reimbursed in 
full. (Emphasis, the Court's.) 
In April of 1967, the Utah Supreme Court decided 
Worthen v. Shurtleff & Andrews, supra. There the follow-
ing facts appear: 
(1) Plaintiff was injured in the course of his em-
ployment. 
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(2) Plaintiff received compensation from the State 
Insurance Fund. 
( 3) Plaintiff commenced an aotion against the third-
pa:r1ty tortfeasor, whiCJh case was settled and in which case, 
plaiinrtJiff recovered his damages. 
(4) The State Insurance Fund was then ordered into 
the case for a determination as to how the recovery should 
be disbursed, and to show cause why it should not be re-
quired to bear its share of the aittorney's fees. 
( 5) The trial court awarded to plaintiff attorney's 
fees as to the amount of reimbursement, and the Uta:h 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding as follows: 
Where .each of the parties [the injured em-
ployee and the insurance carrier] ha.s the right to 
bring the action [against the third-party tort-
feasor] and one takes the initiative and obtains a 
recoviery for the benefit of both, it is only fair that 
each bear his share of the expenses necessarily in-
curred in doing so. * * * In providing that if 
recovery is oibtained against the third party the ex-
penses including attorney's fees shall be charged 
"proportionately against the parties as their inter-
ests may appear," it is to be noted that those terms 
could not apply to the two parties in the original 
acition (plaintiff Worthen and defendant Shurtleff 
and Andrews) because Worthen receives from 
Shurtleff and Andrews who have no further inter-
est in it after paying it over. Therefore, the only 
possible "parties" who have "interests" in the money 
are Worthen and The State Insurance Fund (the 
latter being entitled to reimbursement.) * * * 
* * * When a statute undertakes an allo-
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cation of funds, the sequence in which it does so 
should be regarded as having some significance. 
* * * If rwe do as the staitute says and make the 
allocation provided in paragraph (1) first, rthat 'is, 
chargiing the recovery with the coots and attorney's 
fees in proportion to the interests of the parities, 
the disbursement sitated first 1is made first, and has 
priority over the proviision for disbursement which 
follows in paragraph (2). Then the re1imbursement 
to ,the insurer is made from the funds 
and to extent possible after the first requirement 
for disbursement is complied with. ThJis application 
of the statute can be reconciled with the require-
ment that the insurer be "reimbursed in full" by 
vegarding that phrase simply meaning reimbuvse-
ment for its full share after the pvior requirement 
of the statute is fulfilled, and the 1insurer cannot be 
compelled to take 'less than its proportionate share 
in any compromise or settlement arranged by others. 
(Emphasis, the Court's.) 
Following the Worthen decision, a number of cases 
with similar facts werie filed against the Utah Starte De-
partment of Finance, as Administrator of the State Insur-
ance Fund. 'The phvintiffs were compensation recipients 
who had obtained recovery from third parties and who had 
repaid the Fund in full the compensation received but with 
a protes:t that the Fund should be requ'ired ito pay its pro-
portionate amount of the attorneys' fees that had been in-
curred in the successful action against the third party. 
'Jlhese cases were all consoiidated for itrial and a decision 
favorable to plaintiffs rendered. This Court hars now ren-
dered an opinion reversiing these plaintiffs' judgments in 
Williams v. Utah State Dep't of Fin., Appea'I No. 11753. 
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'f\he pertinent and essential facts 1were set forth in the opin-
ion as follows : 
Each plaiintiff 1) suffered on .. the-job injuries, 2) 
receJived compensation from tthe Fund under the 
Workmen'1s Compensation Act ('f\itle 35-1, U. C. A. 
1953) 3) sued and recovered judgment against 
third-party torlfeaisors, 4) paid the costs and at-
torneys' fees incident rtJhereto, 5) returned to the 
Fund amounts they had received therefrom, 6) but 
under protest, after refusal of the administrators 
of ,the Fund to share 1in such expenses, 7) all of 
which occurred before th!is court's decision in Wor-
then v. Shurtleff, which required those administer-
ing the Fund to share such expenses in a similar 
case, but 8) after the then 8Ubsisting governing 
case of McConnell v. Comm. of Finance was decided 
by this court, which case was overru'led in a three 
to two decision in the Wollthen case, insofar as it 
was inconsistent with the latter decision. 
The Court concluded: 
That Worthen v. Shurtleff should not be applied 
retroactively so as to permit the plaintiffs here to 
recover part of their costs and attorneys' fees inci-
dent to theiir independent actions against third-
party tortfeasors. 
Another case was filed, following Worthen, by tv,ro 
Salt Lake legal firms in the United Staites District Court 
against an insurance carrier which had written cerrtain 
workmen's compensation coverage. These lawyers had suc-
cessfully handled a number of wrongful death action8 on 
behalf of the heirs of certain workmen who had been killed 
in the course of their employment. The heirs had received 
compensa1tion awards against the insurance carrier as de-
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pendents of the dead workers and had been paiid a pavt of 
such award when the recovery was effected from the third-
party wrongdoer. All of the oompensia1Jion that had been 
received was repari.d from :tJhe recovery and the lawyers 
only charged attorneys' fees on that part of the recovery 
which wa.s in excess of the total compensation that had 
been awarded. This 1egial charge 1was made with the under-
standing that counsels' efforts had not been required by 
nor had they es!tablished any part of the compensaltion 
award which the clients had obtwined by operation of state 
law. The suit was fliled against the insurance carr:ier by 
these attorneys seeking a reasonable :Dee for their recovery 
of the amount of ltJhe oompensation that had been paid and 
the release of further unpaid amounts by reason of the 
provisions of Section 3'5-1-62 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The Williams decision, while expressly limi,ted to the facts 
involved in those particular cases, could arguably be urged 
for the proposition that even under the different circum-
stances of this federal suit, recovery should be denied on a 
theory that the Worthen decision can only operate on claims 
accruing after the entry of such decision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT HAS NOT APPLIED THE COR-
RECT RULE AS TO THE RETROACTIVITY 
OF OVERRULING DECISIONS. 
Appellant, Utah State Department of Finance, as Ad-
ministrator of the State Insurance Fund, acknowledged in 
its brief that "the majority of state coums havie held that 
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decisions wiU be applied retroaotively" but then criticizes 
sucih holdings on the ground !that the couPts had followed 
the erroneous philosophy ,that they only interpreted ii.aw 
and didn't create it and that an overruled decision "shouM 
be trea;ted as if it never was" (Appellant's Brief pp. 4 
& 5). 
the legal writers relied upon by appellant for 
the conclusions were correct in their observations is open 
to question. A careful readling of many of the cases con-
cerned with the question of whether to apply the rule of an 
overruling decision retroactively or only prospectively re-
veals that the great majority of these cases held for a 
retroactive appliication for the sake of uniformity and equal 
treatment unless legal relations were affected that had 
been entered into in reliance on the overruled decision. Such 
cases created an exception to the general rule of retroac-
tivity because to a retroactive application in such cir-
cumstances would be contrary to the understanding and 
reliance of the parties involved and produce unjust and in-
equitable results. 
The following quote from appeHants' brief, setting 
forth the so-called Austinfan view that is relied on by the 
appellant, acknowledges this generaiJ. rule and exception: 
Aus.tin maintained the judges do, in fact do some-
thing more than discover law; they make i.t, in many 
instances. He advocated thaJt rather than be eras·ed 
by a later deoision, an over-ruled decision is to be 
considered a juridical fact and cases decided un-
der it and relations entered into in reliance on it 
are not to be distu11bed. (Appellant's Brief p. 6.) 
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J.t is submitted that in the cases involved in this appeal 
there are no relations entered 1into in reliance on the Mc-
Connell decislion nor do they involve any cases decided un-
der McConnell any more than did the Worthen case. 
Here, as in Worthen, the simple facts are that the com-
pensation recipient hired counsel and expended costs in 
seeking a recovery from a third person, which recovery, by 
statute, had Ito the interests and cla:ims of the com-
pensation carrier. Such carrier was thus enabled :bo sit 
back and let rsomeone else expend the time, money, and 
effort on its behalf to obtaiin for it a full recovery with no 
obligaJtion for such service and recovery. 
The State Insurance Fund did not ,enter into legai re-
lations, change its position or otherwise rely on the Mc-
Connell case to its detriment. The relationships and actions 
of the parties in proceedings seeking recovery from a third 
party pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-1-62 remain 
the same whether the McConnell decision or the Worthen 
decision is applied except as to equitable sharing in fees 
and costs. The only detriment and inequity involved is in 
the continued application of the McConnell decision after 
it has been determined that the legislative interpretaJtion 
contained therein was erroneous. 
Appellant's contention that, by the decis1ion in the 
McConnell case, this court "created" the law rather than 
"interpreted" it is clearly spurious. It cannot be 
that courts can "create" law. The considerable criticism 
of the recent past against :Vhe Supreme Court of the United 
States for ,this practice graphrically establishes this fact. 
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There is, however, no basis for the contention of appellant 
that law was "created" by t}ilis 1Court fa the McConnell case , 
for the Court was there merely interpreting the intention 
of the legislature in passing Section 35-1-62 Utah Code An-
notated, 1953. This Williams decision, however, does sub-
ject this court to rtJhe criticism of "creating" law by "judi-
cial legislation" for it in effect legislates a difference in the 
application of the statute during the period of time between 
the decision in the McConnell case and the one in the Wor-
then c&Se. This court in Worthen again interpreted the 
legislative intent, concluded McConnell was ·erroneous, and 
thereby reversed the effect of the same statute as to the 
recovery of a:ttorney's fees from the compensation carrier. 
Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, tbhis 
statute shoold be applied uniformly and iin a non-discrim-
inatory manner. 
It is readily acknowledged that while the rule of retro-
acti vity is firmly entrenched as a basic premise of our 
judicial syS1tem, it is not without certain exceptions which 
are as well founded as the rule itself. The danger of the 
oversimplification of such exoephons is neatly pointed out 
by the appellant in its brief where it quotes authoritatively 
from Ameriican Jurisprudence in support of the sweeping 
proposition that "the overruling of a judioial construdtion 
of a statute will not be given retroactive effect .... " (Ap-
pellant's brief page 5.) The utilization by 1appellanrt of this 
American Jurisprudence quote also points out the danger 
of "black letter" legal conclusions from treatises which 
oversimplify or overstate the nuances of fairly complicated 
legal propositions. Indeed, the American Jurisprudence 
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oversimplification is neither a full nor an accurate reflec-
tion of the liaw, nor does it purport to be, for the footnote 
to the section cited by appellianrt; refers to a comment note 
in 85 A. L. R. 262 in which 'it is stated: 
The general principle 1is that a decision of a court 
of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former 
sion is retrospective in operation, and the effect 
is not that the former decision is bad faw, but that 
it never was the law. To this the courts have es-
tablished the exception that, where a constitutional 
or statute law has received a given construe1tion by 
the courts of last resort, and contracts have been 
made and rights acqu:ired under and in accordance 
with such construction, such contracts may not be 
invalidated nor vested rights acquired under them 
impaired by a cihange of construction made by a 
subsequent decision .... The true rule in such cases 
is held to be to give a change of judicial construc-
tion in respect to a statute the same effect in its 
operation on contracts and existing contract rights 
that would be given to a legislative repeal or amend-
ment; that is to say, make it prospective, but not 
retroactive. (Emphasis Added.) 
The point is thus made clear that it is not because the 
change of judicial construction involved a statute that re-
quired the application of an exception to the general rule 
of retroactive application, but rather, because there were 
contracts or contract rights that would be invalidated or 
impaired unless such overruling decisions were given pros-
pective effect only. Such an exception 1would apply not 
only to overruling decisions involv:ing statutory interpreta-
tions but to any overruling decision where retroactive ap-
p]ication would subject persons who have justifiably relied 
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on the overruled decision to substantial unfairness or undue 
hardship. 
The case of Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & 
Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 77 L. Ed. 360, 53 S. Ct. 145 
(1932), relied on by the ,appellant, supports this rule. The 
Supreme Court there held at page 365, 287 U. S.: 
A state in defining the liimits of adherance to prece-
dent may make a choice for itself between the prin-
ciple of forward operation and that of relation back-
ward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, 
though later overruled, are law none the less for 
intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases 
intbimating, too broadly (cf. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flana-
gan, 263 U. S. 444, 68 L. Ed. 382, 44 S. Ct. 197, 
supra), that it must give them that effect; but never 
has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them 
if !it P'leases, whenever injustice or hardship will 
thereby be averted. [Citing cases.] * * * The 
a1ternative is the same whether the subject of the 
new decision is common law [Citing casas.] or stat-
ute. [Citing cases.] The choice for any state may be 
determined by the juristic philosophy of the judges 
of her coul'lts, their conceptions of law, its origin 
and nature. (Emphasis, the Court's.) 
This case involved a suit between a carrier and a shipper 
for recovery of excass tariff charges. Because the carrier 
and shipper were presumed to have bargained on the basis 
of existing law including the judicial construction placed 
on a statute, the Supreme Court of Montana provided that 
its new rules with respect to such suits should operate pros-
pectively only. Jusbice Cardozo in the decision did not speak 
favorably of the Austinian approach as claimed by appel-
18 
lant bwt merely concluded that :bhe highest court of the state 
may make a choice for itself whether the new rule shall 
operate prospectively or retroactively, whether the subject 
of the new decision is common law or the construction of 
the statute. 
For a number m other cases which Hkewise provide 
for prospective application only where retroactive 
tion would 1effect rights contracted or established in rel1i-
.ance on the prior decision, see the following cases.: Kelley 
v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 P. 593 (1898); State v. Jones, 
44 N. M. 623, 107 P. 2d 324 (1940); County v. 
Queen City Lodge No. 197, 1.0.0.F., 195 Okla. 131, 1'56 
P. 2d 340 ( 1945) ; Linn County v. Rozelle, 177 Ore. 245, 
162 P. 2d 150 (1945); Arizona State Tax Comm'n v. En-
sign, 75 Amz. 376, 257 P. 2d 392 (1953); Forster Ship-
buil,ding Co. v. Los Angeles County, 54 Cal. 2d 45, 6 Cal. 
Rptr. 24, 353 P. 2d 736 (1960); State ex rel. Wash. State 
Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P. 2d 833 
( 1963). 
H i'.S respectively submitted that unless ithis Court can 
determine and find that the appellant had obtained vested 
rig'hts in reliance on McConnell which would be invalidated 
or impaired by the retroactive application of the Worthen 
decision, or that appellant would be otherwise inequitably 
harmed if retroactive effect were giiven to Worthen, or 
that 1the rule :in Worthen can be fairly and adequately 
effectuated without applying it retroactively, or that the 
administration of justice would be unduly burdened by 




ALLOWING RECOVERY IN THE WORTHEN 
CASE AND DENYING RECOVERY HERE DE-
FEATS THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND IS 
ARBITRARY, DISCRIMINATORY, AND UN-
JUST. 
'Dhe only differences in the facts of the Worthen case 
and the cases at bar are that the plaintiff in Worthen ob-
tained a favoraible decision from this court before the 
claims of the plaintiffs in ,the other cases reached this 
court, and that plaintiff in Worthen refused to pay the 
State Insurance Fund before obtaining such a decision 
while the pfain:tiff s here paid the Fund under proteslt. 
These distirrctions do not logica:lly support a favorable re-
sult to the plaintif:f in the Worthen case and an unfavorable 
one to the plaintiffs in these cases on a basis of denying 
retroactive effect to the Worthen decision. 
We have pointed out under Point I that the facts of 
the cases involved in this Williams decision do not come 
within any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule 
of retroactive application of overruling decisions. Even, 
however, if such facts did come within an exception to this 
general rule and 1therefore require prospective effect only, 
such prospective treatment should have been expressly 
provided for in the Worthen decision together with a de-
nial of recovery to the plaintiff in that case. In other words, 
consistency and uniformi!ty require that only those cases 
with claims arising after such decision was rendered should 
have the benefit of the overruling decision. 
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If the Court authorizes, as it did in Worthen, recovery 
for a claJim which arose prior .to the overruling decision, 
there is neither logk nor justice in denying recovery Ito 
other similJar claims. Justice demands the ·equa;l treatment 
of indistinguishable claims and a uniformity in the dispen-
saiton of a ru'le of la1w. 
The propriety of departing from the general rule of 
retroactivity by laying down a new rule to apply prospec-
tively after a given date has been vigorously attacked by 
Judge Rober't Von Moschzisker of Pennsylvania in an ar-
ticle iin 37 Harvard Law Review. He says at page 426: 
Such a method would nolt only be plain and outright 
legislation by the courts, but must prove quite in-
eff ectua:l as a practical remedy, since parties would, 
in all probability, be unwiHing to attack by litiga-
tion points already settled, when a new ruling would 
alter the law only prospectively, and could not be 
applied to their dispute. Furthermore, our judicial 
system would have .to undergo a decidedly question-
able change before judges would be willing to apply 
one rule of la;w to the case before them, and lay 
down an opposite one by which they and their suc-
cessors should be bound in the future. Under onr 
existing system the latter attempted ruling could 
be nothing more than dicta. 
This quote points up another problem inherent in the 
Williams decision and that is that the Court, despite its 
statement to the contrary, has engaged in "judicial legisla-
tion". Section 35-1-62 was enacted in 1945. In October 
1962 the McConnell case was decided, interpreting this stat-
ute and concluding rthat the 'legislature intended to give the 
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compensation carrier a full recovery of compensation pay-
ments made by it without incurring any obligation for legal 
services rendered and coots expended to accomplish this 
result on its behailf. In April 1967 the Worthen case again 
reviewed this same statute and then interpreted the legis-
lative intent to be exactly contrary to the previous holding 
by deciding that the compensation carrier was obligated to 
pay a reasonable fee for such services. Thus the Williams 
decision, in denying a retroactive effect to the Worthen 
ca..se and in effect denying that the legislative intent was 
the same during all of the period of time from the enact-
ment of the seeition in 1945 to the present, constitutes "ju-
dicial legislation" in which this court expressly stated that 
it did not wish to engage. 
POINT III. 
THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS FOUND IN 
THE WORTHEN AND WILLIAMS CASES 
CONSTITUTE A DENIAL TO THE PLAIN-
TIFFS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
TO A UNIFORM OPERATION AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF LAW. 
There are two significant provisions of the Utah Con-
stitution which we submit are applicable in this case. They 
are: 
1. Article I, Section 2: "All political power is 
inherent in the people; and all free governments are 
founded on their authority for their equal protection 
and benefit, and they have the right to 'alter or reform 
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their governments as the public welfare may require." 
2. Artiicle I, iSection 24 : "All laws of the general 
nature shall 'have uniform operartion." 
It has been repeatedly pointed out that there are no 
valid differences or distinctions between the plaintiff in 
the Worthen case and the plaintiffs here whfoh would affect 
the application of the concept of retroactivity. To apply 
·different rules to the same causes denies unff orm operaition 
of ithe law of thi·s Staite and the equal protection of the law 
to !this citizens of thi.s Staite becrause such decisions are dis-
criminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore un-
constitutional under the express provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
This Court, in State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 
920 (1938), stated the rule as follows: 
It is only where some persons or transaction.s ex-
cluded from 1Jhe operation of the law are as to the 
subject matter of the law in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation that the faw is 
discriminatory in ithe sense of being arbitrary and 
unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to diff eren-
tiate those included from those excluded from its 
operation can be found, it must be held constitu-
tional. 
* * * A classification is never unre2sonable or 
arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for the d'iff erentir.tion 
between classes or subject matters included as com-
pared to those excluded from its operation, provided 
the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to 
the purposes to be accomplished by the act. (Em-
phasis added.) 
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The Worthen decision was obviously intended to give 
a correct judicial interpretation to the legislative intenrt in 
passing Section 35-1-62. This case held that one of the leg-
islative purposes to be accomplished by this section was to 
require compensation carriers to bear a full proportionate 
share of the legal expenses involved in effecting a recovery 
from a third party. This interpretation is obviously just 
and equitable, and there is no reasonable basis for absolv-
ing some compensation carriers of this obligation merely 
becau.se a recovery was effected during a period of time 
when an erroneous judicial interpretation of this section 
was outstanding. 
The McConnell case defeated the legislative purpose 
and intent of equally distributing the expense in eff ectuat-
ing a recovery between the injured worker or his heirs and 
the compensation carrier in third-party cases. Now that 
this has been overruled and the controlling section correctly 
interpreted, all injured workers or their heirn whose claims 
are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations 
should have the same right to recover the fees or costs ex-
pended by them that are allocable to the compensation car-
rier's interests. The desirability of such a result is even 
cle8.rer in the case where an attorney directly sues the com-
pensation carrier for his fees in representing the compen-
sation carrier's interests where he has not attempted to 
effect any collection of such fees, on the carrier's part of 
the recovery, from the injured workman or his heirs. 
The case of Toronto, et ux. v. Sheffield, et al., 118 
Utah 462, 222 P. 2d 594 (1950), is enlightening and per-
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suasive on the necessity for uniformity and equal protec-
tion of law. This case involved an act of the legislature 
which distinguished between real estate sold for delinquent 
taxes before 1939 and similar sales made after 1939. In 
holding such distinctions unoonstitutional, this Court stated 
at page 599, 222 P. 2d: 
Our State Constitution, Article I, section 24 
provides that "all laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." And Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution 
forbids any state to "deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". ':' ':' * 
* * * 
Here, there is no basis whatever for the dis-
tinction made. The conditions surrounding the sale 
to the county under [statute] since the 1939 amend-
ment and the objects and purposes thereof are ex-
actly the same as those of [earlier and similar stat-
ute] prior to that amendment. The only factual 
difference whatever is a slight change in the pro-
cedure and the fact that the sale made under the 
former statute must have been made before the one 
under the present statute and therefore deals with 
a claim which is more stale. Certainly that fact 
would not justify the distinction of barring the 
newer claims while not barring the older ones. We 
therefore conclude that this differentiation between 
these two classes of sales bears no reasonable rela-
tion to the purposes to be accomplished by this act 
and therefore hold that the discrimination against 
persons who as plaintiffs here purchased tax titles 
transferred to the county under the statute in effect 
prior to the 1939 amendment is arbitrary and un-
reasonable and therefore is unconstitutional. 
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See also the following cases in which the Utah Supreme 
Court has held legislative acts to be violative of the uni-
form operation of law required of the Utah Constitution: 
State V. Bayer, 34 Utah 257, 97 P. 2d 129 (1908); Salt Lake 
City v. Utah Power & Light, 45 Utah 50, 142 P. 1067 
(1914); State V. Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894 ( 1921), 
aff'd, 285 U. S. 105, 76 L. Ed. 643, 52 S. Ct. 273; Gronlund 
v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P. 2d 464 (1948); 
Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P. 
2d 97 4 (1961); and Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 
2d 412, 375 P. 2d 756 ( 1962). 
The Fourteentih Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution is likewise violated by the decision in the Williams 
case as a denial to the plaintffs of "equal protection of the 
laws." The equal protection clause, of course, covers all 
forms of governmental action whether legislative, judicial 
or executive. It protects citizens against unequal treatment 
by reason of arbitrary distinctions and differences. Because 
there are no real logical distinctions between the cases in-
volved in the Williams appeal and the Worthen case with 
respect to the issue of retroactivity, the adverse Williams 
decision constitutes a denial of equal protection of laws. 
See Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U. S. 231, 74 S. Ct. 
505, 98 L. Ed. 660 (Mo. 1954), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886). 
POINT IV. 
IF THIS COURT SHOULD DETERMINE TO 
FIND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS, SAID DETER-
1HNATION SHOULD NOT BE ON THE BASIS 
OF REJECTING RETROACTIVITY. 
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This Court has pointed ourt in its majority opinion that 
said opinion should ibe confined to the "particular circum-
stances of the instant cases." Indeed it h1as gone so far as 
to say "this is not to say that there cannot 'be decisions that 
have retroacrbive effect in a given set of circumstances." In 
addition, the special concurrence of Mr. Justice Ellett indi-
cates that other factors present in the instant cases may 
very well have influenced the Court in arriving at its ulti-
mate decision. As a matter of fact, we suspect that the 
principle enunciaited in rthe case of Baugh v. Darley, 112 
Utah l, 184 P. 2d 335 (1947), may have had a greater in-
fluence in bringing about the ultimate decision than the 
concept of retroactivity. 
Section 35-1-62 provides that from any third-party 
recovery "the reasonable expense of the action, including 
attorney's fees, should be paid and charged proportionately 
against the parties as their interests may appear." Any 
claim for attorney's fees would enure to counsel rendering 
the service and would be charged agains,t the share of the 
proceeds recovered by the defendant Insurance Fund. 
The payment by the plaintiffs to their attorneys of an 
attorney's fee on the portion of the recovery from the third 
party which fully satisfied the compensation award and 
thus made the State Insurance Fund whole would be gra-
turtous and officious. The Restatement of Restitution, Sec-
tion 2, sets forth the rule that "a person who officiously 
confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution 
therefor." See also 17 C. J. S. "Contracts" Section 6 at 
page 573. The Restatement of Restitution, Section 1 (b) 
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at page 12, defines a "benefit" :in the of quasi con-
1tract or unjust enrichment as follows: 
b. What constitutes a 'benefit. A person confers a 
benefit upon another if he gives to the other posses-
sion of or some other interest in money, land, chat-
tels, or choses in action, performs services benefi-
cial :to or at the request of rthe other, satisfies a debt 
or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the 
other's security or advantage. (Emphasis added.) 
In Baugh v. Darley, supra, plaintiff sought restitution 
for alleged unjust enrichment conferred upon defendant 
by reason of efforts expended by him in procuring a pur-
chaser for defendant's land, the possession of which the 
plaintiffs held under an oral agreement to sell to plaintiff. 
The court stated: 
The mere fact that a person benefits another is not 
of itself sufficient to require the other to make res-
titution therefor. Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 
1, comment c. Services officiously or gratuitously 
furnished are not recoverable. Restatement of Res-
titution, Sec. 2. Nor are services performed by the 
plaintiff for his own advantage, and from which the 
defendant benefits incidentally, recoverable. See Re-
statement of Restitution, Sec. 40, comment c; and 
Sec. 41 (a) (i). 
See also Chandler v. Wash. Toll Bridge Authority, 17 Wash. 
2d 591, 137 P. 2d 97 (1943); Cf. Stein v. Simpson, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 79, 230 P. 2d 816 (1951); Brown V. Thornton, 150 
Mont. 150, 432 P. 2d 386 (1967); Osborne v. Boeing Air-
plane Co., 309 F. 2d 99 (9th Cir., 1962). 
We submit that this Honorwble Court should have a 
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fresh opportunity to reconsider its decision against the 
:Pl1aintiffs and if, after such reconsiderattion, it is still satis-
fied that they shou1d n'Ot recover, it should decide whether 
such adverse rulring would be better premised on the basis 
of lthe Baugh case rather than on fue denial of retroactivity 
with its inequi1taible and impl'ications. 
We come back once agaiin to the fundamental concept 
thaJt the legislative intent was to allow attorneys to recover 
fees on compensation awards required by statute to be re-
covered in /third-party cases and rtha.it a denial of retroactive 
recovery plainly and simply constitutes an unnecessary 
broadcast of rinjusttice throughout the state. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that this Honorable Court 
should grant our Petition Ibo appear amicus curiae and 
should grant a reheari.ng for ithe :following reaisons : 
First, this Court has clearly pronounced ithe legislative 
intent wihen Seotion 3'5-1-62 was passed into law in the year 
194'5. That legislaJtive intent was to eliminate free rides 
for compensation carriers in third-party cases. The stat-
ute, thusly interpreted, has eliminated injustice and made 
eaoh interested party bear its share of attorneys' fees and 
costs. There is absolutely no defensible reason why this 
injustice should be perpetrated not only on ,the seven here, 
but upon other similarly s'ituated lriltiganits throughout the 
state. 
Second, to allow recovery to the first litigant to reach 
the courtroom, Worthen, and deny iit to aH others similarly 
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situated, constitutes judicial discriminaiti1on between classes 
equally entitled to the 'benefits of staJtu'te. It is our position 
that this decision would constitute a violation of "uniform 
operation" of 1aws and "equal protection and benefit" of 
laws contrary to the Uta:h Constitution. The same decision 
would likewise violate rthe "equal protection of faws" pro-
vision of the United States Constitution. 
And, third, if the majority of this Honorable Court 
has reasons other than an ouitright refusal to allow retro-
active appliication of the Worthen interpretation, as would 
seem to be the case in view of the special concurrence and 
careful language in the majority opinion confining same 
to the facts of the seven cases now before the Court, then 
the Bench and Bar should be so advised so that obvious in-
justice stemming from ·the concept of denied retroactive 
application of the Worthen interpretation can be eliminated 
from Utah law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
